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There is remarkably little literature, of either a theoretical or qualitative bent, on
institutional failures or the policy failures that lead to bad decision making. With
over 3500 colleges and universities, observers can find many examples of bad
decisions, from falsifying data, to fraud, to bad personal behavior of leaders.1 Any
organizational sector with so many actors and moving parts will inevitably reveal
perfidy and human failure. Today, I begin a longer project to identify such decision
making and to more systematically categorize these failures. There is, of course,
much literature on maximizing decision making where not understanding college
metaphors results in bad choices. Thus, the inverse of James March’s garbage can
model, Victor Baldridge’s political-power model, James Millett’s
scholarly-community model, and the many other such theoretical bases would lead
to bad decision making.2 Ignoring Mazmanian and Sabatier’s implementation

† Copyright © 2012 Michael A. Olivas.
* William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law and Director, Institute for Higher
Education Law and Governance, University of Houston Law Center. This study was
presented at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law in January, 2011, as the 2011
Jerome Hall Lecture. I appreciate the invitation of Dean Lauren K. Robel to give the Hall
Lecture and the exceptional work of the Indiana Law Journal editorial staff who improved
the Lecture to publishable form. University of Houston Law Library Associate Director Mon
Yin Lung also provided detailed research assistance, for which I am grateful.
1. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Villanova Says Inaccurate LSAT and GPA Data Were
‘Knowingly Reported’ to the ABA in Prior Years, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 6:52 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_villanova_law_dean. There have been so many
cases of colleges fraudulently inducing applicants to apply for money and deceiving them,
that the Federal Trade Commission has a regular website to report such practices
(“Scholarship Scams”) and to “prevent fraudulent, deceptive and unfair business practices.”
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/scholarship/
Scholarship
Scams,
FTC.GOV,
index.shtml. In Virginia, a jury found a college guilty of fraud and breach of contract in the
closing of a program. Mason Adams, Nursing Students Awarded Damages, ROANOKE TIMES,
July 1, 2011, at A1.
2. See generally ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE: RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND
DECISION MAKING (J. Victor Baldridge ed., 1971); JOHN D. MILLETT, THE ACADEMIC
COMMUNITY: AN ESSAY ON ORGANIZATION (1962); Michael D. Cohen, James G. March &
Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1
(1972).
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theory,3 Canon and Johnson’s compliance theory,4 Cobb and Elder’s agendabuilding theory,5 and other political science theories will likely lead to ineffective
structural inculcation of policy decisions of any meaningful fashion. That poor
policy making is not the subject of more scholarly theoretical work is likely due to
scholars trying to make sense of what actually works and what theories advance our
understanding of higher education organizations, rather than examining the criteria
associated with failure. It is unsurprising, therefore, that so little theory focuses
upon bad theory and ineffective implementation per se, even if doing so might have
considerable explanatory power. Recently, Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice
Randall T. Shepard, only partially tongue-in-cheek, wrote about “Big, Dumb
Trends” affecting state courts and provocative developments, such as inexorable
demographic trends.6 And David H. Freedman, in his popular text, Wrong: Why
Experts Keep Failing Us—And How to Know When Not to Trust Them,7 examines
many dubious forms of professional expertise and even makes provocative,
Letterman-like lists. (As just one example, done right, whistle-blowers are a useful
irritant and corrective to the system.)8
There is a small applied literature on bad college decision making, one that
largely consists of case studies of failure. The best example of this genre is the
qualitative study by Jerrold Footlick. Footlick is a reporter who wrote Truth and
Consequences: How Colleges and Universities Meet Public Crises,9 a book that

3. DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN & PAUL A. SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1983); see also LADISLAV CERYCH & PAUL A. SABATIER, GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND MIXED
PERFORMANCE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS IN
EUROPE (1986).
4. BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION
AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999).
5. ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING (2d ed. 1983); Roger W. Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross & Mark
H. Ross, Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 126
(1976).
6. Randall T. Shepard, Four Big, Dumb Trends Affecting State Courts, 43 IND. L. REV.
533 (2010).
7. DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG: WHY EXPERTS KEEP FAILING US—AND HOW TO
KNOW WHEN NOT TO TRUST THEM (2010).
8. There is substantial literature on the efficacy and promotion of whistle-blowing to
reveal corruption and wrongdoing. See, e.g., MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING
THE WHISTLE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL & LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND
EMPLOYEES (1992); Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case
of Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (1985). After the 2002 enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), federal law codified whistle-blowing in
an attempt to reduce corruption in corporate financial reporting. See Terry Morehead
Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757 (2007). There is a national
office to coordinate the dozens of various applicable federal statutes across many
departments and agencies. See Office of the Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, http://www.whistleblowers.gov.
9. JERROLD K. FOOTLICK, TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES: HOW COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES MEET PUBLIC CRISES (1997). Another genre of college media failure is the
single-case study of a given disaster, such as an authoritative book about the Duke lacrosse
scandal, written by several different observers. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES: DUKE LACROSSE,
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includes nine chapters devoted to higher education institutions’ failures to
communicate with the media about scandals or major disasters. Such case studies
run from the University of Utah’s embarrassing treatment of “cold fusion” and The
Ohio State University’s firing of truculent football coach Woody Hayes, to a court
case at the University of Georgia (Jan Kemp’s firing over her whistle-blowing on
academic practices in an athletics support program) and the campus judicial system
on trial at the University of Pennsylvania (hate speech and the “water buffalo”
matter).10 Of course, not all of the case studies—all of them interesting topics in
their own right—were about failures of governance. But some were clear failures,
such as the case of President James Holderman of the University of South Carolina
who actually served jail time for fraud. Footlick notes allegations that Holderman,
despite considerable information on his inappropriate spending and sexual habits,
was not reined in by the University’s trustees. A former governor accused the board
of being “blinded through political drunkenness.”11 To Footlick, all the cases were
examples of how badly higher education interacts with the press and other media.
Mining another vein of bad decision making, law researchers Richard Delgado
and Jean Stefancic examined a series of legal decisions that they consider to be
“serious moral errors,” “embarrassingly inhumane decisions,” and “moral
abominations.”12 Such cases include now-discredited decisions in racial matters,
Indian law, Chinese immigration, Japanese internment, women’s suffrage, forced
sterilization, and gay rights. Most are older cases, now eclipsed by different
community norms, cultural times, and societal assumptions (although the gay rights
case is from 1986, only four years before the article was written). They defined the
cases concisely:
The concept of “serious moral error” is, of course, impossible to define
and perhaps ultimately incoherent. We use the term in three limited
senses. A decision will be said to embrace serious moral error if (1) it
lacks nuance to an embarrassing degree; (2) it is broadly or universally
condemned by subsequent generations, somewhat akin to being
overruled; (3) its assumptions, e.g., about women, are roundly refuted
by later experiences. Judges will always hand down decisions that will
seem offensive to some. We reserve the term “serious moral error” for
those shocking cases that virtually everyone later condemns.13
Delgado and Stefancic’s intriguing take on bad judicial decision making is
instructive, as their criteria are straightforward, and they examine the cases through
parsing and showing alternative results. Several of their picks were
nineteenth-century racial blunders, such as those affecting blacks (Dred Scott14 and
Plessy v. Ferguson15), Native Americans (Johnson v. M’Intosh, where Chief Justice
UNIVERSITIES, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Howard M. Wasserman ed.,
2011).
10. FOOTLICK, supra note 9, at ch. 2, ch. 3, ch. 8, ch. 9.
11. Id. at 99.
12. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929–30 (1991).
13. Id. at 1930 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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John Marshall characterized Indians as “fierce savages, whose [chief] occupation
was war”16), and Chinese (immigration restrictions cases such as Chae Chan Ping
v. U.S.17), but they also chose to examine a twentieth-century case involving
Japanese (internment cases, such as Korematsu v. U.S 18). Another nineteenthcentury case, Bradwell v. Illinois,19 allowed Illinois to bar law graduate Myra
Bradwell from practicing law because she was a woman and because the “natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life.”20 Delgado and Stefancic’s twentiethcentury choices included the 1927 forced-sterilization case of Buck v. Bell21 and the
more recent 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, that upheld Georgia’s sodomy
statute,22 which was already notorious by the time Delgado and Stefancic wrote
their 1990 article. By then, retired Justice Lewis Powell already showed remorse
and recanted his decision to uphold the decision.23
Clearly, we can learn from bad decision making, and indeed, we do on a regular
basis when we evaluate actions and policies. There is a weak theoretical basis for
understanding such errors: it is a soft science at best, one that is largely anecdotal.
It may also be true that the actual implementation of policy clears up or rounds the
corners off excesses. I regret that my stab at this issue may not advance the “theory
boulder” very far up the hill, as it is a first attempt, but I do propose some
theoretical considerations at the end of this project.
My own candidates for bad college policy making include cases where I believe
decision makers disregarded good sense, did not consider the full range of
alternatives, and made avoidable bad choices. In a footnote, Delgado and Stefancic
characterize the range of mistakes to include lesser technical errors (“failing to
reflect carefully on precedent”) or ones of prudence (for example, “exercising bad
business judgment in a contract matter”).24 Unfortunately, as the regental,
administrative, or agency decisions made on a daily basis in higher education are
not recorded or published in a search engine, relatively little “academic common
law” accretes over time, correcting errors or overturning bad decisions. As in the
case of the zen riddle about trees falling silently in the forest, the only incidents that
exist do so in the public imagination through the news media or through litigation
as part of a communications feedback loop.

16. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
17. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
18. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
19. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). For an excellent review of the long struggle for
women’s suffrage and the fitness to practice law, see Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets:
Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1364–75 (1995).
20. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
21. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”).
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
23. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5,
1990, at 3 (former Justice Powell admitting he “probably made a mistake” in Bowers).
24. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1930 n.7.
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In the next Part, I propose four examples of bad policy making and speculate
why each is bad. Of course, none is the policy equivalent of Dred Scott or
Korematsu, but I hope readers agree that each is a bad idea by the criteria I pose. In
my final Part, I ruminate on the criteria, anticipate objections, and suggest areas for
future scrutiny.
I. LEGACY OR ALUMNI PREFERENCE ADMISSIONS
Despite substantially changed demographics and conditions, many public
colleges continue to employ a criterion that is unearned by the applicant, is
unrelated to the applicant’s merits, is highly correlated with wealth, and is almost a
perfect proxy for race: legacy credit. Legacy credit, also called “alumni privilege,”
is a seemingly innocuous entry in the admissions laundry list employed by many
colleges, but I believe that it has no proper place in public college admissions
criteria.25 My reasoning includes four interrelated points: (1) the practice is
fundamentally unfair, as it does not incorporate merit or achievement, but rather
advantage; (2) the practice is particularly unfair in those jurisdictions not legally
allowed to practice affirmative action in the admissions practice; (3) legacy
admissions might arguably be acceptable and appropriate for private independent
institutions, but even in this nonpublic sector, colleges should use them cautiously;
and (4) legacy practices, where they might arguably be appropriate, should reward
parental attendance, but should not be extended further, either horizontally
(siblings) or vertically (grandparents).
First, the practice itself is unfair. If your parents attended college, you already
have been conveyed several clear advantages. It means the applicant comes from a
well-educated family and, therefore, already has inherited many economic,
educational, and other psycho-social benefits. Alumni parents—even in schools
without formal legacy practices—often are also able to convey a benefit by
personally contacting admissions officials to inform them of their child’s interest in
attending their alma mater. Thus, the benefit is conveyed even in a nonpreferential
world. And make no mistake, it is preferential. A February 5, 1999 Chronicle of
Higher Education story revealed that Texas A&M University (TAMU) admitted
two to three thousand legacy students in 1996 to 1997, and it quoted TAMU
officials as indicating that for two hundred students, alumni preference was the
“deciding factor.”26 That number was more than the number of African Americans

25. See AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010); Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility,
Hereditary Privilege, and the Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School
Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375 (2006); Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara
L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of
Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51 (2009);
Scott Jaschik, Legacy of Bias, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/09/22/legacy.
26. Kenneth Ma, Texas Bill Would Bar Admissions Preferences for Alumni Relatives,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at A38.
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who enrolled as freshmen at TAMU that year.27 Data from TAMU show that in
2000, 201 such legacy students were admitted, primarily on plus points.28
I am certainly not saying that all other criteria are meritorious or show the true
abilities of applicants. After all, family income also clearly correlates with
standardized exam performance; and access to Advanced Placement courses,
honors courses, calculus, Latin, and other advantageous curricular opportunities
also parallel wealth through high school location, or where one lives and the
relative wealth of a neighborhood. But legacy credit simply piles on, without any
achievement by the applicant. Moreover, unlike racial affirmative action, which is
predominantly a proxy for redressing disadvantage, alumni or legacy admissions
are an attribute of privilege and advantage.
Second, this practice is particularly unfair in states such as California or
Washington, where the use of race is proscribed, or in states where a misguided
Fifth Circuit court opinion restricts colleges’ ability to use race as a factor in
admissions, notwithstanding Bakke.29 Many opponents to affirmative action have
persuaded the courts and public opinion that any use of race is unfair. Where are
these opponents now, with this proxy for white advantage? That TAMU would use
it is particularly pernicious, given the institution’s longstanding practices of
excluding women and people of color. TAMU has not provided recent racial data,
but my discussions with TAMU admissions officials suggest that virtually all such
admits were Anglo, as would be expected.30 The University of Michigan (UM)
admissions cases revealed its use of this device as well.31 After Grutter v.
Bollinger,32 TAMU refused to implement the case’s holdings or to use race in
admission, but left its legacy program in place until it was embarrassed into
abandoning the practice.33 To make matters worse, some schools, including TAMU,
extended this privilege to Aggie brothers and sisters, not just parents. Even if public
universities choose to use alumni points, they should restrict legacy admissions
points to children of graduates. If, as I have argued, parental preference is bad
enough, sibling privilege is even more attenuated and even poorer public policy.
Third, it is true, as some legacy supporters say, that courts have upheld the
practice. I acknowledge that courts have done so—and recently. The dreadful

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Bakke decision was
upheld by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).
30. I had extensive discussions with TAMU admissions and legal staff and faculty
during a series of interviews I conducted on October 14–15, 2010. In order to gain their
confidence, I promised anonymity to the persons with whom I discussed these issues.
31. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding alumni preference acceptable).
32. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
33. “At Texas A&M, one of its most important traditions is what we call the Myth of
Merit: that the academic environment, and especially admissions decisions, are based solely
on an individual’s merit. Unfortunately, A&M’s use of merit as a lodestar is inconsistent and
hypocritical, and must be re-evaluated.” John Brittain, Michael Olivas & Rodney Ellis, Now,
Aggies Need to Take the Next Step, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Now-Aggies-need-to-take-the-next-step1474239.php.
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Hopwood v. Texas34 opinion appeared to allow the practice, as did one of the UM
admissions cases.35 In the former, the Hopwood panel decision reads, “A university
may properly favor one applicant over another because of his ability to play the
cello, make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory. An admissions process
may also consider an applicant’s home state or relationship to school alumni.”36
And in a related ruling, U.S. District Judge Patrick Duggan held that with regard to
UM alumni privileges, “there is no overall discriminatory impact.”37
However, both courts are wrong, in my judgment. Hopwood was wrong in
several respects, and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately repudiated its holding with
regard to race in Grutter, even if it did not affect legacy practices. Judge Duggan
did not analyze the race of the UM legacy students and discounted them, even
though the legacy points figured in more admissions to UM in most years than did
their affirmative action practice. The best (and most cynical) insight into this
phenomenon came, predictably, from the late Justice Blackmun, who said in Bakke,
“[Colleges] have given conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed of
athletic skill, to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess
on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous,
and the powerful.”38 But even if courts were correct, and this practice was
allowable, I raise the question of whether, as a matter of public policy, it should be.
I, of course, answer in the negative. Private schools, without any constitutional
restrictions, may do so. Public schools should not.39
Fourth, minority admissions officials, and even minority legislators, have told
me that, in time, the legacy situation will work out so that black and Chicano
parents (in Texas, in this instance) can eventually pass this privilege on to their
children now coming of age. I believe this eventuality is chimerical and will simply
never come true. Juxtapose the numbers of white alumni parents whose children
apply to college with those few minorities who are in a position to pass it on.
Indeed, in Texas, the graduation data suggest that in selective public colleges, the
arc of such admissions will never improve to the point where alumni privilege
produces points for a substantial number of minority students.40

34. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
35. Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801–02 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
36. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996).
37. 135 F. Supp. 2d at 801–02. There has been an outpouring of scholarship on these
cases and issues, but among the most careful readings of the cases before the U.S. Supreme
Court is the work by William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent
Developments in Litigation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
173 (2001).
38. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978).
39. While private schools are not prohibited by the Constitution from using alumni
preferences, a number, do, even in elite private elementary schools. See, e.g., Jenny
Anderson, She’s Warm, Easy to Talk to, and a Source of Terror for Private-School Parents,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A23 (story of NYC Dalton School admissions, including
alumni preferences); see also John D. Lamb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy
Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491 (1993) (noting that use
of alumni preferences is widespread at elite private colleges).
40. TAMU data show that all minority enrollments at the College Station campus are
under their percentage in the state population, and in the high school percentages; white
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In Hopwood, the panel judges allowed alumni privilege, which they termed the
applicant’s “relationship to school alumni”; they also concluded that a college
could consider “whether an applicant’s parents attended college” (a first-generation
preference).41 In the context of law schools, consider these two criteria: one rewards
applicants fortunate enough to have parents who were allowed to attend the law
school, and one rewards applicants whose parents did not attend college. When
implemented at public schools, the former criterion excludes substantial numbers of
African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Asians. At the University of Houston,
which became a public institution in 1963,42 the first black law student did not
graduate until 1970,43 and fewer than one dozen Mexican Americans graduated
before 1972.44 Even as recently as 1971, the first-year class at the University of
Texas Law School (UTLS) did not include a single black student.45 Children of
early 1970s UTLS minority graduates, if born while their parents attended law
school, would now be eligible for the alumni preference, but they would be in
competition with the thousands of white applicants who could and would also
invoke the privilege. While it is true that the latter criterion (first-generation
preferences) would more likely favor minority children whose parents were denied
admission or were unable to attend college, many uneducated white parents would
likewise transmit this “advantage.” A Texas Coordinating Board study group
reviewing alternative admissions criteria determined that there were no good
proxies for race.46 Deracinating the racial criterion simply cannot work.
Of course, there is a trickle of minority alumni at states’ elite public colleges,
but it is just that, a trickle, not the river we should have expected based on most

students are overrepresented in the campus enrollment. See TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY,
VISION 2020 METRICS PRESENTATION: 2010 UPDATE 51 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 TAMU
REPORT] (providing a graph, titled Minority Populations and High School Percentages,
which was compiled using data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) and Census
Bureau 2009), available at http://www.tamu.edu/customers/oisp/reports/vision-2020progress-2010.pdf. Additonally, in school year 2010-11, white students have declined to
1,538,409, or 31.2% of the total in the state’s public K–12 institutions. See TEX. EDUC.
AGENCY, ENROLLMENT IN TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 2010–11, at 8 tbl.4 (2011), available at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/acctres/enroll_index.html.
41. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
42. UHLC data and enrollment history were provided by Leah R. Gross, Director of
Annual Giving and Alumni Relations, Office of External Affairs, University of Houston Law
Center, May 20, 2011.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 558 (W.D. Tex. 1994). For a critical legal
history of the University of Texas’s racial admissions, see Thomas D. Russell, “Keep
Negroes Out of Most Classes Where There Are a Large Number of Girls”: The Unseen
Power of the Ku Klux Klan and Standardized Testing at The University of Texas, 1899-1999
(Univ. of Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-14), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1583606.
46. TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION COORDINATING BOARD, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE
HOPWOOD DECISION ON MINORITY APPLICATIONS, OFFERS, AND ENROLLMENTS AT PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS 12–13 (1998), available at
http://www.thecb.state.tx.us/reports/PDF/0016.PDF.
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states’ public K–12 school enrollment data.47 The four out of 100 points TAMU
awards may not seem like a big matter, but if it is not, should not the presumption
be that TAMU and other public colleges do not need them? When TAMU admits
nearly 11,000 students each year, and between 2000 and 3000 students have the
extra four points accorded alumni legacies (out of the 100 total possible points),48
can it be a small matter? I urge faculty at institutions with these practices to rise up
and insist they be stopped.
These cases, and many others I could have analyzed, show that the distribution
of scarce benefits remains a contentious issue, one that divides American society
along tectonic plates of race, class, ethnicity, and gender, among other dimensions.
Like immigration cases that define who we are as a polity or as a people, so too do
admissions cases define us as a nation.49 Inasmuch as higher education is the great
engine of upward mobility in our society, how we constitute our student bodies is
an important consideration. Unfortunately, due to historical racism and unequal
educational opportunity, race remains a fugue in postsecondary education to this
day. Therefore, understanding the admissions process and the practices that form its
common law is an important key to understanding our country’s complex racial
history.
II. LINKING STATE COLLEGE APPROPRIATIONS TO TEST SCORES
In an understandable attempt to improve the quality of public schools over the
last twenty years, legislatures enacted plans to tie tax revenues to school district
performance, such as conditioning state aid upon student test scores, teacher
certification, or other markers. For example, Texas enacted a “career ladder”

47. TAMU is 80% white in a state where whites are less than 35% of the population in
high school. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. TAMU officials explained that the “Aggie Points” were four points of the 100 points
required for a perfect score. I had extensive discussions with TAMU admissions and legal
staff and faculty during a series of interviews I conducted on October 14–15, 2010. In order
to gain their confidence, I promised anonymity to the persons with whom I discussed these
issues. See also Ma, supra note 26 (acknowledging that as much as one third of the freshman
class received legacy points, including 200 who were admitted by virtue of the four points).
49. MARIA PABON LOPEZ & GERARDO R. LOPEZ, PERSISTENT INEQUALITY:
CONTEMPORARY REALITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED LATINA/O STUDENTS
(2010); VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2005); Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social
Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1065 (1997); Victor C. Romero, Noncitizen Students and Immigration Policy Post9/11, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 357 (2003). In a particularly troubling development, even some
prestigious elementary schools have long-established legacy admissions, which in some
instances can swamp the availability of admissions slots available to the public. Jenny
Anderson, Elite Schools Rethink Saving Seat for Little Sister, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at
A1 (“Of those 62 spots at Trinity, one of New York’s most competitive schools, 33 were
taken first by qualified siblings of Trinity students. An additional 11 went to children of
alumni, who also get a leg up in the process, and one more belongs to the child of a staff
member. That left 17 spaces for families with no ties to Trinity, giving those without
connections a 2.4 percent shot at the prize.”).
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program in the 1980s, promising pay raises for certain teacher behaviors; another
statute created “master teacher” certification, which was never funded and was very
unpopular with teachers who both distrusted the program’s requirements and were
skeptical the state would back the program financing.50 There have even been
privately funded efforts, such as those instituted by the Milken Family Foundation,
which award grants to teachers whose students score well on state-required exams.
Of course, the charter school movement has also tied resources in some instances to
student performance in the special programs.51
States have also linked increased funding to the performance of their colleges.
For instance, performance-funding criteria award additional resources to colleges
in Colorado that graduate minority students, while public institutions in other states
receive additional formula aid for students who attain their degrees within five
years.52 At the margins, such formulae may stimulate colleges to improve their
performance, although they can backfire if a college takes fewer at-risk students
and reduces access overall by skimming off only less-needy prospects.
Alternatively, institutions can “game” such statutes and regulations by exploiting
loopholes, creating new casks for old behavior, or seeking exemptions. In a 1986
study,53 for instance, I found that colleges were largely ignoring changes in
immigrant student policy following a U.S. Supreme Court decision that rendered
the practices illegal or obsolete.54 Like my nephews who rake my yard badly so I
will send them away, colleges can drag their feet rather than implement legal or
policy mandates. Institutional foot-dragging likely sabotages many more top-down
requirements than is generally acknowledged. Department chairs can outwait
deans, who can outlast provosts, and so on. And not many cases, statutes, or
regulations come with effective enforcement mechanisms or implementation tools.
However, sometimes mandates, especially those that control funds or have
funding mechanisms, require institutional attention. In Ohio, there was an
interesting and dreadful funding proposal that originated in the state’s coordinating
board, the Ohio Board of Regents (OBR), which assists the legislature in
coordinating public college-funding formulae.55 In 1996, the OBR proposed a plan

50. See generally Lynn M. Cornett, Trends and Emerging Issues in Career Ladder
Plans, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Nov. 1985, at 6, available at http://12.4.125.3/ASCD/pdf/
journals/ed_lead/el_198511_cornett.pdf; JANE ARNOLD LINCOVE, SW. EDUC. DEV. LAB.,
DESIGNING TEACHER INCENTIVE PAY: LESSONS FROM TEXAS (2010), available at
www.sedl.org/blueprint/files/lincove_blueprintforum_pres.pdf.
51. DARREL DRURY & JUSTIN BAER, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2011); CHRISTOPHER A. LUBIENSKI & PETER C. WEITZEL, THE
CHARTER SCHOOL EXPERIMENT: EXPECTATIONS, EVIDENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS (2010).
52. A Colorado statute enumerates the statewide expectations and goals for higher
education. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-104 (West 2003). Several of these were repealed
soon after, but most of the provisions remain law in 2011. See, e.g., 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws
723 (section 15 repeals §§ 1.5 and 2).
53. Michael A. Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admissions:
Undocumented Adults and “Enduring Disability,” 15 J.L. & EDUC. 19 (1986).
54. Id. at 23–29, 41–42, 54 nn.312–13 (reviewing Texas practices and a Texas Attorney
General Opinion on undocumented college residency).
55. Laurel-Ann Dooley, Making the Grade: Ohio Regents Tie State Law School
Subsidies to Scholastic Achievements of Incoming Students, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 36.
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that was intended to tie a portion of annual state funding to the state’s five public
law schools to the two quantifiable measures used by those schools to admit
students: their students grade point averages (GPAs) and Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) scores.56
The OBR plan, which was to take effect in 2000, would have provided state
subsidies in a two-step fashion. In the first tier, schools would get funding for all
Ohio students who fell above the set point of a median GPA (3.25) and median
LSAT score (sixty-fifth percentile); for the second phase, the schools would receive
additional funds for each Ohio-resident student with a 3.5 GPA and eightieth
percentile LSAT score (“second capped tier”). In addition, the schools would get a
subsidy for ten percent of any state students, irrespective of their scores. This
complex formula, with additional and reduced nonresident provisions, was
predicted to equate to 124 fewer first-tier subsidies (at $4,625 per full-time resident
student) at Cleveland State, as one example.57 The Ohio State University and
University of Cincinnati law schools would likely have gained under the plan,
while Akron, Toledo, and Cleveland State likely would have lost resources relative
to the then-existing plans.58
Deans of the three northern law schools, faced with the prospect of substantially
reduced funding, loudly protested, as did officials at the Law School Admissions
Council (LSAC), which devises and administers the LSAT. The LSAC executive
director, for example, opined that the funding plan was “a terrible misuse” of the
LSAT, which is intended only as an admissions tool, predicting likely success in
the first year of law school.59 “My objection is really as strong as I can make it,” he
said.60
Misuse of the LSAT in the admissions process is itself a major problem, as the
test is a mild predictor of law school first-year grades, even when combined with
GPA for undergraduates.61 It has been my own experience in serving on admissions
committees for many years, and after reading thousands of law school and graduate
applications, that there is an institutional overreliance on standardized test scores.
Particularly troubling is the common law school practice of combining LSAT
scores and GPAs into a weighted-index score, and then using the test score again as
a criterion in making the decision, in effect counting a score twice. Such practices
simply give test scores a weight they cannot bear, especially in psychometric terms.
I have written about this (too) extensively, so I spare readers here the details, but
one important point is worth noting: in educational circles, we accord too much

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Philip Shelton).
61. See, e.g., Phoebe A. Haddon & Deborah W. Post, Misuse and Abuse of the LSAT:
Making the Case for Alternative Evaluative Efforts and a Redefinition of Merit, 80 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 41 (2006); William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and
Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite”
College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (2001).
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deference to standardized tests, imbuing them with near cult-like reverence and
significance.62
In a subsequent ruling, the Fifth Circuit upheld the application of the Grutter
principles but was dismissive of the Texas “Top Ten Percent Plan,” which had no
racial criteria but also minimized the usual test scores for rank in high school class:
Mindful of the time frame of this case, we cannot say that under the
circumstances before us UT breached its obligation to undertake a
“serious, good faith consideration” before resorting to race-conscious
measures; yet we speak with caution. In this dynamic environment, our
conclusions should not be taken to mean that UT is immune from its
obligation to recalibrate its dual systems of admissions as needed, and
we cannot bless the university’s race-conscious admissions program in
perpetuity. Rather, much like judicial approval of a state’s redistricting
of voter districts, it is good only until the next census count—it is more
a process than a fixed structure that we review. The University’s formal
and informal review processes will confront the stark fact that the Top
Ten Percent Law, although soon to be restricted to 75% of the
incoming class, increasingly places at risk the use of race in
admissions. In 1998, those admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law
accounted for 41% of the Texas residents in the freshman class, while
in 2008, top ten percent students comprised 81% of enrolled Texan
freshmen. This trajectory evidences a risk of eroding the necessity of
using race to achieve critical mass with accents that may, if persisted in,
increasingly present as an effort to meet quantitative goals drawn from
the demographics of race and a defiance of the now-demanded focus
upon individuals when considering race.
A university may decide to pursue the goal of a diverse student
body, and it may do so to the extent it ties that goal to the educational
benefits that flow from diversity.63
However, using test scores and GPAs to determine state appropriations is just a
poor idea. Not only would such legislative funds drive the admissions process,
rather than the schools, but it would mean that the law schools would be seduced

62. For other takes on the efficacy and psychometrics of the LSAT, see William D.
Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and
Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975 (2004). For opinions
regarding the misuses of the LSAT, see Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993); William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender
Bias on the LSAT and Its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1 (2000); Michael A. Olivas, Brown and the Desegregative Ideal: Location,
Race, and College Attendance Policies, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2005); Michael A. Olivas,
Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in
Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065 (1997); Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education
Admissions and the Search for One Important Thing, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993
(1999); Michael A. Olivas, Law School Admissions After Grutter: Student Bodies, Pipeline
Theory, and the River, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16 (2005). Readers are advised to provide their
own pillows.
63. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2011).
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into weighting these two criteria even more than they currently do. Just as the
inclusion of such numbers in ranking schemes (such as U.S. News & World
Report’s) leads the tail to wag the dog, so would Ohio public law schools choose
their student bodies on numbers instead of the many criteria available to the
schools, such as essays, life experiences, work records, letters of reference, and the
dozens of other markers included in the typical application package.64
If legislators want to condition funds, I believe better public-policy ends are
advanced by employing exit criteria, such as graduation rates, rather than entrance
indices, although such measures occasion other problems. If higher education’s
value is transformative, there need to be many avenues to admission and fewer
limitations upon the raw materials—students. If a legislature wishes to cap the total
number of hours a student can take without graduating, or limit how long they can
matriculate, or even use special funds to expand or restrict professional school
spaces (such as precious spots in medical, dental, veterinary, or pharmacy schools),
then thoughtful plans and financial formulae to do so are welcome. And using
reasonable restrictions on nonresidents, while usually a bad idea, is at least
grounded in reasonable public policies to favor state residents or domiciliaries. But
the colleges need exclusive jurisdiction and discretion over the admissions process,
especially in postbaccalaureate programs such as professional schools and graduate
schools.
Are there better ways for states to improve their professional school funding
systems? Yes, including several that are difficult to undertake. First, formulae
should be reviewed for their efficiency and efficacy; this includes fully funding the
fiscal programs in place. I have examined many states that have reasonable and
detailed formulae for funding professional schools, even including such complex
schemes as professional libraries, which are not fully funded, so that each year is
catch-up. In addition, compacts, consortia, and “rental” space arrangements
between certain high-prestige professional programs in one state and other states
that arrange contracts or consortia should be regularly reviewed. For instance, some
states lease spaces in high-demand/low-supply programs, such as optometry and
pharmacy schools in other states.65 The University of Houston, for example, holds
open and available a number of places in its pharmacy and optometry schools for
residents of other states that do not have such programs.66 Baylor College of
Medicine in Houston, a private institution, is paid a subsidy for each Texas resident

64. See, e.g., Anne M. Richard, Law Schools, in THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS OFFICER’S
GUIDE 453 (Barbara Lauren ed., 2008).
65. As one example, the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education maintains
a regional Professional Student Exchange Program that arranged the consortial exchanges
and enrollment policies. See W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR HIGHER EDUC., STUDENT
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS: STATISTICAL REPORT: ACADEMIC YEAR 2010–11 (2011), available at
http://www.wiche.edu/info/publications/statReport1011.pdf.
66. The Atlanta-based Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) coordinates a
multi-state regional consortium, the Regional Contract Program (RCP), which is a tuition
exchange program offered to students in the various health professions. See Regional
Contract Program, S. REGIONAL EDUC. BOARD, http://home.sreb.org/acm/rcp/rcp.aspx.
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medical student it enrolls;67 in New York, Cornell’s veterinary school and School
for Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) have similar arrangements as “statutory
colleges,” although the host institution is a private, Ivy League university.68 An
interesting court case arose at Alfred University, when several students were
dismissed for disciplinary infractions, yet students in the state-sponsored ceramics
engineering program were given more due process than were other students in the
private college, due to New York State’s contracting of their places.69
If it were done carefully and with input from the institutions, plans to expand or
contract enrollments could be undertaken in reasonable fashion, especially if there
were long term planning, not just year-to-year fluctuations. And while it is difficult
to do well, programs could be closed or eliminated. There are cases that show how
it can be done successfully (such as Moore v. Board of Regents, where the State
University of New York (SUNY) Regents closed doctoral programs in English and
history at SUNY-Albany),70 and likewise, ones where the institution acted badly or
ineptly, such as Behrend v. State of Ohio,71 where Ohio University (OU) closed its
School of Architecture, but did so in such a fitful and poor fashion that even OU
students won a judgment for losses due to their wasted time. Of course, it is easier
to move a graveyard than it is to close a program, but in many respects it is
institutionally preferable to giving thin gruel to existing programs, causing them to
go gaunt.
As a postscript on law school appropriations, the OBR conducted additional
research, including testimony from Ohio law deans, and withdrew the proposal
before it was to be implemented in 2000.72 But a stake needs to be driven through
the heart of extramural or legislative uses for standardized exams. In early 2007,
the Commissioner of the Texas Coordinating Board, the statewide higher education

67. Unlike most private institutions that charge all students the same tuition, Baylor
College of Medicine, while a private institution, differentiates between Texas residents and
nonresidents for tuition purposes, and receives a subsidy from the state in order to provide
these contract services. In 2010–11, the resident medical school tuition (exclusive of fees
and other costs) was $6550; nonresidents were charged $19,650. See Direct Educational
Expenses 2010–2011, BAYLOR C. OF MED., http://www.bcm.edu/financialaid/
index.cfm?pmid=7448#texas.
68. The State of New York contracts with several of the private Cornell University
programs to reconstitute them as less-expensive options for state residents. As an example, an
English major or physics major in the private (“Endowed Ithaca”) Arts and Sciences unit would
pay $41,325 annually for tuition in 2010–11, as would a nonresident even in the contract
colleges (Agriculture and Life Sciences; Human Ecology; Industrial and Labor Relations), but a
New York resident in the same contract colleges would pay only $25,185 annually for tuition.
http://www.dfa.cornell.edu/
See
Tuition
Rates
and
Fees,
CORNELL UNIV.,
treasurer/bursar/studentsparents/tuition/index.cfm#CP_JUMP_175485.
69. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
70. 378 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1978).
71. 379 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
72. At an Ohio Board of Regents meeting on March 23, 2000, the Board agreed to refer
to staff a study “to explore alternative funding mechanisms for law school subsidies that do
not rely exclusively on student enrollments.” See Ohio Board of Regents Meeting Minutes 3
(Mar. 23, 2000), available at regents.ohio.gov/board_meetings/bdmeet/apr00/
min032300.pdf.
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agency, suggested in all seriousness that the LSAT or the Graduate Record
Examination (GRE) be used as required exit exams for graduating seniors in fields
where there are no existing Educational Testing Service instruments.73 This rush to
enact measurable learning outcomes will inevitably lead to poor choices of
measurement tools, and this increased reliance upon standardized testing regimes
will hardly provide the assurances that its proponents seem to desire. It will likely
lead to increased stratification, poor institutional behaviors, and other detrimental
consequences such as has happened in the K–12 sector, where high-stakes testing
has shown itself to be a chimerical search for quality and accountability.74
III. PROGRAM DISCONTINUANCE
I have never heard a reasoned discussion of faculty tenure take place where the
words “faculty deadwood” were not spoken. This term, like other code words,
disguises more than it reveals. After thirty years in the academy, I am not
unmindful to the fact that some few colleagues do not carry their weight, or have
lost their effectiveness in their duties, but I would observe that these are a small and
almost irreducible number, surely in contrast to those many who dedicate their lives
to the professoriate and who spend (too) many hours in their classrooms, offices,
labs, and libraries. Should faculty not perform their duties, there are several means
of removing them, ranging from informal “pushouts” all the way to more formal
tenure revocation firings or post-tenure provisions. In my own experience as a
faculty member, program chair, and associate dean, I have participated in the whole
range of such activities, trying to make even the most difficult cases as humane as
possible.75

73. The following discussion took place during a 2008 board meeting:
Dr. Raymund Paredes said the problem with [a single measure of excellence] is
you can measure a threshold of competence, but you cannot measure what part
of that the university is responsible for. He suggested that there be an effort to
align the SAT and other exams, such as the GRE, LSAT, and so forth. There
are enough common data elements so that learning outcomes can be measured.
Not all graduates would necessarily need to take the exams, but one could take
a sample size to measure learning outcomes at a given institution. Some private
companies are already beginning to do that.
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board March 6, 2008 Meeting Minutes, in Texas
Higher Education Coordinating Board, Joint Meeting of the Academic Excellence and
Research Committee and the Participation and Success Committee (Apr. 23, 2008),
available
at
http://www.thecb.state.tx.us/events/committeemeetings/AER/2008_04/
Agenda.pdf.
74. See generally R. MURRAY THOMAS, HIGH STAKES TESTING: COPING WITH
COLLATERAL DAMAGE (2005).
75. I confess that even I have not always been entirely truthful or forthcoming when
asked about some troubling colleagues who were under consideration elsewhere. I am
particularly remorseful about one incident, where I glossed over one schnook’s difficulty as
a colleague and his poor work habits when I was called by a search committee at another
school. In a technical sense, I did not lie, but I concede that I offered no elaborations upon
his poor record as a colleague. Judging by how many times I have been burned by others’
lack of candor when the situation was reversed, I will have many colleagues in purgatory
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The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has promulgated
extensive guiding principles and detailed guidelines for dismissing faculty, from
denying tenure to removing tenured faculty. To remove faculty with tenure, the
AAUP allows removal for such extreme cause as certain medical reasons, faculty
malfeasance, or moral turpitude, as well as removal not for cause but for such
intervening acts as bona fide institutional financial exigencies and authentic
program discontinuances. But in my view, program discontinuance (or in AAUP’s
infelicitous but thorough terminology, “Discontinuance of Program or Department
Not Mandated by Financial Exigency”)76 is a prime example of bad governance. In
bona fide financial exigency proceedings, all the books are opened and a massive
institutional bankruptcy procedure is undertaken with faculty involvement and
shared governance. Everyone understands that there is a widespread problem, akin
to that of a bankruptcy, and realizes that sacrifices will have to be made, even if it
means eliminating programs and faculty. Poorly done, you have American
Association of University Professors v. Bloomfield College,77 where the judge
found there to be no true exigency, but only a crude plan to eliminate faculty as a
transparent and cynical ploy that did not even save money. Done right in a
collaborative and professional way, however, as in Krotkoff v. Goucher College,78
courts will likely ratify such a practice. In Krotkoff, the Goucher College faculty
and administrators made the difficult decision to terminate a tenured German
literature faculty member (one of several) in favor of another tenured faculty
member who could teach both German and French language courses. In this
instance, and in other non-Bloomfield types of cases, judges have upheld such
decisions, especially when the decisions are made with faculty participation.79 In
Krotkoff, the judge noted, “[t]he necessity for revising Goucher's curriculum was
undisputed. A faculty committee accepted elimination of the classics department
and reduction of the German section of the modern language department as
reasonable responses to this need.”80
And the entire college need not be in financial trouble to trigger cutbacks, as the
AAUP program discontinuance policies indicate. In Scheuer v. Creighton
University, the Creighton School of Pharmacy experienced financial distress due to
reductions in federal health funds, while the rest of the University remained
relatively healthy.81 The court thus held that Scheuer, a tenured School of
Pharmacy faculty member, could be dismissed under the theory that financial
exigency need not be necessary in the entire institution for its principles to apply—
as long as there was due process available and institutional bona fides. I could
quibble with elements of Scheuer, where the trial record raised serious questions
about the cycle and ebb and flow of funds. I could more easily live with a result
that in a comprehensive institution the entire enterprise need not be in a death rattle
with me when we all die.
76. AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (2009), available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/
pubsres/policydocs/contents/RIR.htm#b7.
77. 322 A.2d 846 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
78. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 682.
80. Id.
81. 260 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1977).
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before exigency or program discontinuance procedures are employed. However, I
would require that the faculty be involved in the decision making, that it be bona
fide, and the books be open to genuine and searching examination. I understand and
appreciate that Professor Matthew Finkin82 and the AAUP would require more, and
that the judges were circular in their reasoning:
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s reasoning is contrary to the purpose as
well as the history of academic tenure. Inasmuch as every institution
has centers of “loss” as well as centers of “profit,” the Nebraska court
would give essentially unfettered discretion to university administrators
to select tenured faculty from among loss centers and terminate them
on grounds of a “financial exigency,” while nevertheless continuing to
operate the deficit-incurring program in a financially sound institution.
Given the uncertainties of external financial support, enrollment, and
programmatic popularity, relatively few faculty could rest secure in the
knowledge that their currently self-sustaining schools or programs will
always continue to be self-sustaining. Thus, the potential chilling effect
on the exercise of academic freedom occasioned by the court’s
approach is significant.83
I also confess that Browzin v. Catholic University of America84 flabbergasts me
each time I teach it in my Higher Education Law class. Browzin, along with Spuler
v. Pickar85—the University of Houston case I will consider next—are the nadir of
program discontinuance and financial reasons for dismissing or not tenuring
faculty. In my own value system, I consider these two cases to be the Dred Scott
equivalents of faculty dismissals. At Catholic University of America’s (CUA) large
School of Engineering and Architecture, Professor Browzin began teaching in the
fields of structures, soil mechanics, and hydrology in 1962. I am advised by
engineering professor friends that these are traditional bread-and-butter courses in
many civil or mechanical engineering departments. After the traditional
probationary period, by the 1969–70 academic year, Browzin had received tenure,
but was notified that his appointment would not be renewed after 1970 due to a
financial retrenchment and reorganization in the School of Engineering and
Architecture. He sued for reinstatement.
At the time of this case, the AAUP principles did not contain a separate
provision for program discontinuance, such as became necessary after Browzin.
Unfortunately for Professor Browzin, the AAUP program discontinuance
provisions in force in 1970 were incorporated into the financial exigency
regulation, which provided enough wiggle room that Judge Skelly Wright held for
CUA. The regulation then in force read:

82. See Matthew W. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher
Education, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1119 (1980). I thank Professor Finkin for reviewing this section.
We do not agree entirely, but it is a much better draft for his assistance.
83. Id. at 1141.
84. 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
85. No. H-88-1243, 1990 WL 357791 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 1990), aff’d, 958 F.2d 103
(5th Cir. 1992).
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Where termination of appointment is based upon financial exigency,
or bona fide discontinuance of a program or department of instruction,
Regulation 5 [dealing with dismissals for cause] will not apply . . . . In
every case of financial exigency or discontinuance of a program or
department of instruction, the faculty member concerned will be given
notice as soon as possible, and never less than 12 months’ notice, or in
lieu thereof he will be given severance salary for 12 months. Before
terminating an appointment because of the abandonment of a program
or department of instruction, the institution will make every effort to
place affected faculty members in other suitable positions. If an
appointment is terminated before the end of the period of appointment,
because of financial exigency, or because of the discontinuance of a
program of instruction, the released faculty member’s place will not be
filled by a replacement within a period of two years, unless the released
faculty member has been offered reappointment and a reasonable time
within which to accept or decline it.86
Given this conflation of “financial exigency” and “abandonment of a program of
instruction” (program discontinuance), it was held that CUA’s only obligation was
to consider Browzin should a “suitable position” become available within two
years. In part, this situation arose because Browzin’s lawyer stipulated at an earlier
point in trial that he was to be terminated due to “program discontinuance,” even
though there was no actual “program” from which he was being “discontinued.”
There was no degree, no major, and no minor in hydrology; his course load was a
regular load of courses, none of which were revised or taken off the books.
Here is where the judge was snookered. Judge Wright took CUA at its word that
it undertook a “detailed review” and that no suitable position was available. Yet
within eighteen months of Browzin’s ousting, the Department of Civil Engineering
hired another faculty member who went on to teach two courses in water resources
(Hydrology and Hydraulics) and a new course in Planning. Planning! Remember,
Browzin had taught Structures, Soil Mechanics, and Hydrology. When he offered
to take on another course in Structure Design, Browzin was told that other faculty
members were teaching it, including one who had joined the engineering faculty in
1960, two years before Browzin. Judge Wright notes that the emphasis on planning
would likely attract new students and additional external funds for research. He
concluded, “Clearly, [this planning emphasis] was a program significantly different
from what Browzin had been teaching . . . .”87 He also noted some vague
admonitions from an accrediting report that referred to the need for planning.88 Let
us review what happened in this sleight of hand: the new guy would teach
Browzin’s courses, plus a course on planning. A single course had become a
“program,” one of a professor’s four-course teaching load. Browzin was hired in
1962, taught basic courses as he was required, received tenure due to his overall
teaching and scholarship record, and was dismissed seven years later as an
anachronism.

86. 1968 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
54 AAUP BULL. 448, 449 (1968) (cited in Browzin, 527 F.2d at 845).
87. Browzin, 527 F.2d at 851.
88. Id. at 848–50.
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The could-have/should-have list here is a book chapter by itself. How could a
person teaching basic courses for which he had been recently hired become
obsolete? How is the need for one new course the undertaking of an entire new
program? How could the new person who was to teach three of Browzin’s four
courses not be a replacement, triggering the “suitable position” requirement? How
could Browzin become “obsolete” within seven years of being hired? Why didn’t
CUA just make the next hire one that included planning as a field, if it is one or
was one at that time? If it had been a discrete field of study, why not send Browzin
to the University of Maryland, Howard, George Mason, George Washington, or
Georgetown to sit in and audit a planning course so that he could teach it himself?
How can one course or even a new emphasis trigger such a reaction? Where is the
searching and detailed review that coughs up one-quarter of a recently tenured
professor’s load? How could a trial judge and a distinguished appellate judge get
this so wrong? How could the CUA faculty be so asleep at the switch?
Surely the institution begins with the presumption that it is acting in good faith
and the opportunity to show that it was searching and thorough in its program
review. Doing so virtually assures a college of meeting AAUP standards and
passing judicial scrutiny, should there be a suit. But buried in this sad decision is
the evidence that a person’s career at CUA ended because of a one-course revision.
After the decision, the AAUP, which entered an amicus brief in this case on behalf
of Professor Browzin, rewrote its policy to give additional procedural safeguards to
the program discontinuance process and to separate it from its parent—that is,
financial exigency.89 That AAUP brief, written by then-AAUP counsel, Matthew
Finkin (who went on to a distinguished career as a labor lawyer and law professor),
does not reveal that he ended up serving as counsel for Professor Browzin, by leave
of the court, as his trial counsel no longer represented him at the appellate stages.90
By the time the case ripened, it had been stipulated that a genuine exigency
occurred, and the trial court accepted these representations by the university; the
circuit court also accepted them. In fact, the AAUP brief not only made clear that
these representations were unclear, but that even if they had been clear and openly
determined, Catholic University made no good faith effort to relocate Browzin
elsewhere within the university and improperly placed the burden of proof upon
him to prove they had not done so.91 Boxed in by this strategy, he was released by

89. Discussion and correspondence with Matthew Finkin, Director, Program in
Comparative Labor and Employment Law & Policy, University of Illinois College of Law
(June 26, 2011); see also The Association and the Courts, ACADEME, May–June 1989, at 31,
32.
90. Discussion and correspondence with Matthew Finkin, Director, Program in
Comparative Labor and Employment Law & Policy, University of Illinois College of Law
(June 26, 2011).
91. In Browzin, the D.C. Circuit stated the following:
Before trial the parties stipulated that Dr. Browzin was a highly qualified
professor in the field of civil engineering, that he was a tenured professor, and
that Catholic University was faced with a bona fide financial exigency at the
time the termination occurred. They also stipulated that the standards which
were to govern the case were to be found in the 1968 Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, propounded by the
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Catholic University and never taught again. Browzin joined the Site Safety Branch
of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Washington, D.C., as
a researcher, and he served as a widely published scientist with the United States
NRC in the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Division of Engineering
Technology. He died in September 1989 in Montgomery, Maryland.92
Another similar example of an institution behaving poorly is my own University
of Houston (UH), as exemplified by Spuler v. Pickar,93 a 1992 case where UH
denied tenure to German Department faculty member Richard Spuler because of
“financial circumstances” in the department.94 The UH German Department, like
many, was suffering stagnant enrollments; in contrast, the Spanish Department,
which was growing and replacing vacancies in predominantly Latino Houston. This
enrollment situation was given as the reason for not granting tenure to Spuler.95 But
UH had hired Spuler only five years earlier, and, in any event, cutbacks in the
department's funds were entirely administrative. That is, administrators in the
college determined which program areas would receive more funding and which
would receive less funding. My own discussions with UH senior and college
officials at the time revealed that Professor Spuler earned approximately $29,000
for nine months in a college with a budget greater than $60 million and at a
university with a budget greater than $200 million in 1992. In addition, a
more-senior tenured faculty member left at the same time, but the department chair
determined that the replacement priority was for a German literature professor:
[T]wo months after Spuler departed, the University advertised
nationally for a German professor. The University explained that Spuler
was a linguistics expert and taught elementary courses, while the
professor who resigned was a professor of German literature. Although
the basic language acquisition courses could be taught by any German
Department faculty member, specialized knowledge—which Spuler
lacked—was needed to teach the literature classes.96
The Fifth Circuit accepted this “tradeoff.” Following a jury trial in federal court,
the jury found in favor of Spuler, concluding that he was deprived of substantive
due process and that the defendants, in their individual capacities, breached his
contractual rights:

American Association of University Professors (AAUP). Tr. at 6. It was, in
effect, a stipulation that the 1968 Regulations had been adopted as part of the
contract between Browzin and the University, an adoption entirely consistent
with the Statutes of the University and the University’s previous responses to
AAUP actions.
527 F.2d at 845 (emphasis in original).
92. His obituary appeared in The Baltimore Sun. Obituary Search Results, BALTIMORE
SUN,
http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/baltimoresun/ssdi-search.aspx?daterange=99999
&lastname=Browzin&countryid=1&stateid=24&affiliateid=all.
93. 958 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1992).
94. Id. at 107–08.
95. Id. at 107.
96. Id. at 105.
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Plaintiff responds that he was hired in a tenure tract [sic] position;
his qualifications met and even exceeded the requirements for
eligibility for tenure; and he was denied tenure eligibility despite his
qualifications based on financial limitations of the institution at the
time. Plaintiff urges that he had a reasonable expectation based on the
representations in the faculty handbook that he would be genuinely
considered for tenure. Instead, despite the positive recommendations of
the faculty tenure committee, plaintiff was barred from tenure because
of the negative recommendations of his department chairperson and the
dean of the college due to financial considerations. Consequently, the
tenure review was a sham, in violation of his reasonable expectation of
tenured employment.97
The magistrate judge found him to have been “eminently qualified to be a
tenured faculty member at the University of Houston by virtue of his academic
achievements, teaching ability, and service to the university community” but held
that employment at the University of Houston was at-will and based solely on
probationary year-to-year contract appointments.
Crucially, the judge held that the UH Handbook language
does not guarantee the promotion to tenured status following a
probationary period; it merely describes the minimum conditions for
consideration for that position. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
University violated the time limitations for the probationary period and
the mandatory review for tenure time set forth in the faculty handbook.
(In other words, e.g., [sic] the probationary time limitations include
‘year six of the seven-year probationary period.’) Similarly, plaintiff
received timely notice of nonrenewal of his contract as required by the
faculty handbook. While this Court concludes that plaintiff met the
requirements for promotion and tenure listed in the faculty handbook,
as noted, tenure is not automatic. The employee remains an at[-]will
employee and the University is entitled to exercise complete discretion
to deny tenure despite plaintiff's compliance with the requirements of
the faculty handbook.98
Magistrate Brown directed a verdict that overturned the jury verdict:
[E]ven assuming that these standards and criteria for promotion and
tenure constituted a basis for a reasonable expectation for tenure for a
qualifying employee, the denial of tenure based on financial limitations
and declining enrollment in the Department of German was a
reasonable decision. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that tenure was
denied on any other basis apart from those reasons. The budget
restrictions at the time demonstrated a genuine need to limit the budget
of the German Department for both the short and long-term. The
decision to terminate the only Assistant Professor in the department

97. Spuler v. Pickar, CIV. A. No. H-88-1243, 1990 WL 357791, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
15, 1990).
98. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
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was a reasonable decision. The Chairperson and Dean made this hard
decision with as much courtesy and consideration as possible under the
circumstances.99
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied
Spuler’s appeal; after a request for an en banc hearing was denied in May 1992, he
ran out of steam and money and accepted his lawyer’s advice not to appeal
further.100 For several years, until 1999, he taught German and directed German
cultural programs at the Houston Goethe Center, a German language and cultural
center, which closed several years later; in 2011, he is a senior lecturer in German
at Rice University.
Spuler embodies shades of Browzin, who “lacked” the expertise to teach
Planning.101 Spuler was hired five years earlier and taught the subject matter and
course load UH needed him to teach. Yet when UH made its financial decision,
Spuler was not redeployed to teach literature simply because he had not taught it at
UH; he had taught several literature courses earlier. UH did not even exhibit
CUA’s effort to gin up a program discontinuance. At Goucher College, Krotkoff
wanted to be redeployed to a vacancy in economics, an area where she was
certainly not qualified to teach, while evidence shows that Spuler was clearly
qualified and experienced to teach literature, and taught the language classes that
his department had assigned him teach.
But UH committed an even graver sin by inviting Spuler to apply for tenure in
his fifth year and thus enabling his portfolio to advance to the university-wide
promotion and tenure committee. While it is true that UH standards do not require
untenured faculty to be given the reasons for the denial of tenure, there must be a
point at which the college is estopped from asserting financial reasons, especially
when no institutional determinations of financial exigency or program
discontinuance are in evidence. As bad as was CUA’s revocation of Browzin’s
tenured status after a Potemkin program review, UH’s dismissal of Spuler is in
some respects morally worse, because UH led Spuler to believe that his tenure case
would turn on his merits. One died by fire, another by ice, yet both suffered not for
cause, but for enrollment fluctuations and poor administrative planning. In large
and comprehensive multiversities, no single faculty member should be
reconstituted as a program or a casualty of short-term enrollment fluctuations. If
there were such fluctuations, institutions should not hire faculty only to dismiss
them within the decade. Universities are built upon a series of cross subsidizations,
and budgets should not be balanced upon the backs of such faculty. And, at the
least, decisions to terminate persons should be made before they enter the tenure
chute, rather than tantalizing them by placing the fruit so close to their fingers only
to remove it.

99. Id.
100. Spuler, 958 F.2d 103, reh’g denied, No. 90-2408, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11286
(5th Cir. May 15, 1992); discussions with David T. Lopez and Richard Spuler (Apr. 2010)
(on file with author).
101. Spuler, 958 F.2d at 105.
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IV. PLAYING IMMIGRATION COP
Imagine that a United States embassy is overrun and its employees are taken
hostage. Further, all of this takes place on television, and our government is
unsuccessful in rescuing embassy employees. Things are bad and at a diplomatic
and military standoff. Feelings run high against this country. As it turns out, many
students from this country are international students at U.S. colleges and
universities. At a public university in my home state, New Mexico, state college
trustees passed the following resolution:
Any student whose home government holds or permits the holding
of U.S. citizens hostage will be denied subsequent enrollment to New
Mexico State University until the hostages are released unharmed. The
effective date of this motion is July 15, 1980.102
Of course, I couldn’t make this kind of stuff up, for I cannot, even on a bad day,
imagine how a group of smart people, savvy enough to be appointed to an
important board, can act so badly. To be sure, when national security is threatened
at home or abroad, as in this case thirty-plus years ago, even reasonable people
have vengeful fantasies or think the worst of all people who originated from that
country. If truth is war’s first casualty, surely reasoned judgment deriving from
nativist instincts is its second. Moreover, in the singular case of Iran, it was widely
remembered that Iranian students in Iran and in the United States were openly
opposed to the Shah’s regime, and many paid with their lives for this opposition.
When the Shah’s regime was overthrown, and the embassy eventually occupied
Iran, it was students who led the action.103 Thus, anger at Iranian students was not
surprising, even if misplaced.
The United States government responded by requiring all nonimmigrant Iranian
students (predominantly those on F-1, or student, visas) to report to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or be deported. In Narenji v.
Civiletti, this administrative roundup was upheld as lawful.104 As it turned out, very
few of the students were out of status. But immigration is an exclusive concern of
the federal government, and states, including state colleges, may not enact their
own immigration or diplomatic policies, under the doctrine of preemption. Thus,
the court saw through the New Mexico State University regent policy, guised in
fiscal (the Iranian students at the college would renege on their tuition and fee bills)
and safety concerns (they were worried that physical harm might befall these
students on campus). The judge properly rejected these transparent claims and
invalidated the trustee policy.
Following the heinous September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, there
has been a rush to single out international students, as several of the terrorists had

102. Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D.N.M. 1980).
103. See, e.g., Mehdi Bozorgmehr & Georges Sabagh, High Status Immigrants: A
Statistical Profile of Iranians in the United States, 21 IRANIAN STUD., no. 3–4, 1988 at 5, 9–
13 (noting that in 1974–75, Iranians grew to be the largest number of international students
in the United States).
104. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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been students in U.S. flight schools or in the country on student visas.105 For
example, after several years of allowing undocumented college students to establish
in-state residency in the City University of New York (CUNY), this policy was
overturned following the attacks.106 Just the summer before, Texas enacted
legislation that allowed the undocumented to attend college as residents, while
California and other states did so as well, after 9/11.107 Although many colleges
turned over international student files to the FBI and other federal agencies, a
number of colleges refused to do so without warrants or subpoenas. The USA
PATRIOT Act, the omnibus legislation governing immigration and terrorism,
includes a number of provisions that turned up the heat on colleges enrolling
international students and on the students themselves. Many students withdrew and
returned to their home countries until things were restored to some semblance of
order.108
Just as in earlier times, when the British Empire would not let the laws of
Tobago rule their interests at sea, so the U.S. government could not allow New
Mexico State University to have its own foreign policy. In a certain sense, given
the strong feeling occasioned by Iran in 1980 and the Taliban and Al Qaeda
following September 11, 2001, what is remarkable is not how many colleges
behaved so badly, but how few did so.
CONCLUSION
Paraphrasing Delgado and Stefancic’s principles—“serious moral error”
includes cases that “lack[] nuance to an embarrassing degree,” are “broadly or
universally condemned by subsequent generations,” and whose “assumptions . . .
are roundly refuted by later experiences.”109 They consider the matters they
discussed as “monstrous, anomalous—a moral abomination.”110 The examples I
discussed are not necessarily of this high order and did not happen long ago, or
long enough ago to have gained the kind of disapproval or infamy their cases had
gained. Indeed, colleges won the financial exigency and program discontinuance
cases. I chose these cases because, in my view, the colleges or decision makers

105. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and Undocumented College
Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 457–63 (2004); Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone
Wild? College Residency and the Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 99
(2008).
106. See S.B. 7784, 225th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2002).
107. Kevin J. Dougherty, H. Kenny Nienhusser & Blanca E. Vega, Undocumented
Immigrants and State Higher Education Policy: The Politics of In-State Tuition Eligibility in
Texas and Arizona, 34 REV. HIGH. EDUC. 123, 124 (2010); Stella M. Flores, The First State
Dream Act: In-State Resident Tuition and Immigration in Texas, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL’Y ANALYSIS 435, 436 (2010); Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM
Act and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1757, 1764 (2009).
108. See generally Michael A. Olivas, What the “War on Terror” Has Meant for U.S.
Colleges and Universities, in DOCTORAL EDUCATION AND THE FACULTY OF THE FUTURE 249,
255–58 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Charlotte V. Kuh eds., 2009).
109. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1929–30 & 1930 n.2 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 1930.
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(including faculty who played a role in these matters) all acted badly, even if
legally. By the criteria I am developing here, it does not have to be illegal to be bad
decision making or poor moral choices.
I would argue that each of the cases I examine is a confluence of bad judgment,
poor research, and failure to discern the larger harm to the higher education polity.
The Ohio Board of Regents funding formula was so badly developed that it was
never actually put into place; relatively few public schools employ alumni/legacy
admissions because they are so unfair and because admissions criteria are under
more widespread scrutiny; most colleges weather cash flow or enrollment
fluctuations better than did Catholic University or the University of Houston in the
Browzin or Spuler instances; and most colleges do not want to play like they are the
immigration police.
I believe that there are many such cases out in the ether, and I urge scholars and
whistle-blowers to track, publicize, and study them. While there are promising
theoretical approaches to understanding organizational failure,111 there is much
more work to be done in this regard. In this Article, I tracked several possible
models that could be used to implement policies and suggested that variations on
them might be useful to understand poor policy making—the failure to implement,
to communicate, and so on. In addition, I employed a quasi-legal standard of abject
moral failure, as suggested by legal scholars Delgado and Stefancic, to explain
legal decisions that had become widely known as embarrassing over time.112 This
comparison, while instructive, is not fully theoretical and in some ways not a good
parallel, given the basic differences between judicial decision making and higher
education policy making.
Kathryn Schulz, in her book Being Wrong: Adventures in the Margin of Error,
makes the best case for using errors as correctives to the system, although in her
view, it is essential that actions be regularly examined and corrected in a cybernetic
fashion. She notes:
In our collective imagination, error is associated not just with shame
and stupidity but also with ignorance, indolence, psychopathology, and
moral degeneracy. This set of associations was nicely summed up by
the Italian cognitive scientist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, who noted
that we err because of (among other things) “inattention, distraction,
lack of interest, poor preparation, genuine stupidity, timidity,
braggadocio, emotional imbalance, . . . ideological, racial, social, or
chauvinistic prejudices, as well as aggressive or prevaricatory
instincts.” In this rather despairing view—and it is the common one—

111. After my Indiana Lecture and during the revising process for publication, several
very interesting and provocative pieces came to my attention. See MAX H. BAZERMAN &
ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2011); HOWARD WAINER, UNEDUCATED GUESSES: USING EVIDENCE TO UNCOVER
MISGUIDED EDUCATION POLICIES (2011); Thomas Bartlett, Social Scientists Explore Ways to
Save Us from Our Own Decisions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 12, 2011, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/Why-We-Make-Bad-Decisions-and/127882.
112. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 12, at 1930 n.2 (“We reserve the term ‘serious
moral error’ for those shocking cases that virtually everyone later condemns.”).
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our errors are evidence of our gravest social, intellectual, and moral
failings.
Of all the things we are wrong about, this idea of error might well
top the list. It is our meta-mistake: we are wrong about what it means to
be wrong. Far from being a sign of intellectual inferiority, the capacity
to err is crucial to human cognition. Far from being a moral flaw, it is
inextricable from some of our most humane and honorable qualities:
empathy, optimism, imagination, conviction, and courage. And far
from being a mark of indifference or intolerance, wrongness is a vital
part of how we learn and . . . . amend our views about the world.
Given this centrality to our intellectual and emotional development,
error shouldn’t be an embarrassment, [sic] and cannot be an aberration.
. . . As Benjamin Franklin observed in the quote that heads this book,
wrongness is a window into normal human nature—into our
imaginative minds, our boundless faculties, our extravagant souls. This
book is staked on the soundness of that observation: that however
disorienting, difficult, or humbling our mistakes might be, it is
ultimately wrongness, not rightness, that can teach us who we are.113
In her vexing book, Stupidity, Avital Ronell sets out a general theory of why
people act stupidly. Because I am not fully fluent in or conversant with the foreign
language of postmodern, I struggled more than should be necessary to understand
this provocative and densely packed book. In trying to explain the work of the early
twentieth-century German philosopher Robert Musil, Ronell explains:
What Musil has marked with great clarity and necessity is the general
infiltration of stupidity, the need for a double valuation (there is,
without fail, good and bad, slow- and fast-tracked stupidity), the way it
mimes values such as talent, progress, hope—indeed, the way stupidity
has pervaded our highest values—and his example for this actuality is a
Nietzschean one. He shows how the incontestable virtue of loyalty
easily succumbs to the stupidity of the we, gathering the They into an
obedience school on collective parade. Finally the we cannot be
relegated simply to the other shore but falls on me in my own
singularity, at least occasionally, with determined regularity. I am hit
by the They of which I am at times a part. I am not spared my own
stupidity, that of the They, when I join the we. Stupidity in the end is
linked to the finity of knowing. In order to name the limit of knowing,
Musil resorts to the mark of the we: “Occasionally we are all stupid”.
Because our “knowledge and ability are incomplete, we are forced in
every field to judge prematurely”. While this observation offers the
mood and cadence of a “happy ending” for Musil’s troubling topic—
we are all in this together, we are forced by the very nature of finitude:
stupidity is what we share, the share of existence in which we take
part—it is built on the abyss of judgment. Stupidity, which, Musil
writes, falls due to each of us occasionally, rests on the wobbly scale of
a premature judgment. But is it not possible that judgment is

113. KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES
(2010).
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constitutively premature, always ahead of the justice it might have
rendered?114
Occasionally, we are all stupid. I certainly have felt this way, more often than I
would like to admit. Once, when asked by a Chronicle of Higher Education writer
what I thought of legacies, I said something smart-assed like demography would
cure those as well. As if. Just as actors cannot tell in advance that the movie they
are filming will turn out to be just dreadful, so we all make decisions we later come
to regret, usually through employing better data, better strategic reasoning, better
collegial means, and higher moral principles, grounded in better and more
transparent governance. Legal scholar Jules Lobel asks even more fundamental
questions, such as how one knows victory, especially in longstanding civil rights
struggles. In Success Without Victory, he writes:
Those who view justice not as a mere norm but as a turbulent river,
“a fighting challenge, a restless drive,” are continually operating on the
fault line between current reality and human aspiration, between what
is and what ought to be. Success in navigating the river requires
maintaining the tension between reality and aspiration, between what is
and what ought to be, between our reach and our grasp. It requires not
getting stuck on either bank of the river, neither the muddy bank of
reality nor the high cliffs of our dreams.
I am still not sure whether our efforts were successes or failures.
They were successful if they inspire others to struggle, to resist
injustice together, and to eschew the easier, more “successful” path.
They will be successful if they help others, as they helped me, to
understand the meaning of our lives as more than winning or losing.115
Even so, this preliminary inquiry revealed some reasons why good people do
bad things as college trustees or policy makers. I hope that this early attempt will
attract others to the field and that we will better examine, catalog, and understand
bad governance. Doing so will surely enhance our ability to understand good
governance and higher education policy making. Most of us learn from our
mistakes, and professional decision makers are no different. I admire the ambition
of Peter Hall, whose excellent work Great Planning Disasters helped me think
through this project. In his 1980 work, he noted, “I do not want to seem to promise
more than this book can deliver. There will be no grand overarching model which
will explain all previous disasters and guarantee how to avoid new ones. The object
is to begin an explanation, not to end one.”116 I hereby adopt this modest viewpoint
and hope to begin an explanation.

114. AVITAL RONELL, STUPIDITY 93 (2002) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting ROBERT MUSIL, On Stupidity, in PRECISION AND SOUL: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 268,
286 (Burton Pike & David S. Luft eds. & trans., The Univ. Chi. Press 1990) (1978)).
115. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 9 (2003) (citations omitted).
116. PETER HALL, GREAT PLANNING DISASTERS 12 (1980).

